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Analysts play a preponderant role in asset price formation. Although there is abundant 
literature on analysts' outputs, such as price targets, few robust analyses are performed on 
valuation inputs. This paper explores a large sample of analysts’ market risk premium estimates, 
evaluating whether specific characteristics/incentives influence the parameter used when 
performing valuation exercises. We use publicly available I/B/E/S price targets to derive the 
implied market risk premium, obtaining an average of 5.15% for 2010-2019. We then employ 
a multivariate regression analysis and document that analysts providing optimistic earnings 
forecasts use heftier risk premium estimates, possibly to maintain predetermined price targets.    
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The market risk premium (MRP) - the excess expected return of a diversified market portfolio 
over the risk-free rate - has remained at the core of finance theory and literature over several 
decades. The parameter is of critical importance for investors’ portfolio allocation decisions. 
Additionally, it is an essential input in the computation of the discount rates used in valuation 
exercises, and more specifically, in the estimation of price targets and recommendations 
provided by analysts. 
Equity analysts play a preponderant role in asset price formation, with recommendations 
and price targets representing a primary source of information on which investors and other 
market participants base decisions (Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver 2002; Mikhail, Walther, and 
Willis 2007). There is quite an extensive body of studies assessing analysts' outputs, such as 
price targets, earnings, and cash flows (Clement 1999; Mikhail, Walther, and Willis 1999; 
Hilary and Hsu 2013). However, there is a limited number of robust analyses that evaluate 
estimates of discount rates and MRP.  
In contrast to earnings and cash flows, the market risk premium is not observable, restricting 
analysts’ ability to refine it in future exercises. This has led authors to believe that little effort 
is exercised to estimate such a parameter (Green et al. 2014; Mukhlynina and Nyborg 2016) 
and that it may be arbitrarily adjusted to justify predefined price targets. Still, most of the 
evidence found is established on the ground of survey responses that do not analyse sufficiently 
large samples and, most of the time, are very susceptible to selection bias. 
More recently, an additional topic that has gained relevance in finance is the relationship 
between uncertainty and return. The well documented positive correlation between ambiguity 
and market returns (Abel 2002; Chen and Epstein 2002) was challenged by Diether, Malloy, 
and Scherbina (2002), who found that companies exhibiting a higher degree of disagreement in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts tend to perform worse. Notwithstanding, it is still unclear whether 
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earnings disagreement adequately represents market ambiguity, and no consensus is reached 
regarding which measure should be used as a proxy for the latter. 
In this paper, we first provide supporting evidence on the size of the market risk premium 
in the US between 2010 and 2019, calculating the implicit parameter on analysts’ price targets.  
Secondly, we analyse the cross-sectional variation found in the sample, testing the 
hypothesis that overly optimistic analysts may use heftier estimates of the premium to maintain 
pre-established price targets. We present an alternative approach to previous literature, which 
is mostly based on surveys. By using publicly available price targets to calculate the implicit 
MRP used by analysts, we are able to analyse firm and analyst-specific characteristics across a 
sufficiently large sample (153,555 observations). This approach overcomes some of the 
limitations associated with survey responses (e.g., selection bias), enabling more profound and 
robust results.  
Finally, we present a complementary analysis that proposes a new proxy for market 
ambiguity, the systematic disagreement between analysts, measured by MRP estimates' 
dispersion. 
The remaining of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 summarizes previous literature 
on market risk premium and analysts’ estimates. Section 3 describes the dataset and the 
methodology used. Section 4 documents the results regarding the size of the premium and the 
cross-sectional variation of estimates. Section 5 addresses the results of the complementary 
analysis on market ambiguity. Section 6 concludes the paper.  
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Market Risk Premium 
The market risk premium has been one of the most studied subjects in finance literature for 
several decades. Historically, it was assumed that the premium required by investors was simply 
the compensation for the substantially higher inherent risk. However, the size of historical 
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excess returns does not seem to be explained purely by the additional systematic risk incurred.  
Mehra and Prescott (1985) initiated a string of theoretical literature on the equity premium 
puzzle. The authors developed a model, using plausible risk aversion assumptions, that implied 
an equity premium estimate of less than 1%. Furthermore, to obtain the commonly cited 
Ibbotson estimates of 7-9% (Ibbotson 1999), it was necessary to assume an unreasonably high 
degree of risk aversion. This result suggested that the additional systematic risk incurred when 
holding equities did not fully explain the excess return, as implied by standard asset pricing 
theory. "Stocks are not sufficiently riskier than Treasury Bills to explain the spread in their 
return" (Kocherlakota 1996). 
There is a vast body of literature suggesting many possible explanations to the puzzle, such 
as market liquidity and borrowing constraints, transaction costs, imperfect information, 
taxation, survivorship bias, among others (Bansal and Coleman 1996; Constantinides, 
Donaldson and Mehra 2002). Moreover, several authors argue that historical realized returns 
are not necessarily reasonable estimates of expected returns (Elton 2002), which would 
invalidate the Ibbotson estimates as an appropriate proxy for MRP. Therefore, new methods 
were developed to estimate the premium, and results point out to substantially lower estimates. 
Claus and Thomas (2001) used I/B/E/S earnings forecasts coupled with market prices to 
calculate the implied equity premium (through the residual income model). This represents a 
"forward-looking" approach (ex-ante) that does not rely on historical returns (ex-post). For the 
1985-1998 period, the authors obtained an average cost of equity of 11% and an implied market 
risk premium of 3.4%1. Moreover, the results exhibited a declining trend of the equity premium 
throughout the period. Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan (2001), McGrattan, Jagannathan, and 
Scherbina (2001), F. Fama and K. French (2004) have also used ex-ante methods (residual 
income, dividend growth, and Ohlson and Juettner2 models) to estimate the market risk 
 
1 10-year Government T-Bond yields as risk-free rate (Claus and Thomas, 2001) 
2 Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005) 
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premium and obtained similar results to those of Claus and Thomas (2001) (2-4%). 
At the same time, other authors, such as Harris and Marston (2001), Easton et al. (2002), 
Daske, Gebhardt, and Klein (2004), using similar approaches, obtained estimations for the 
market risk premium of around 5-7%. Specifically, Easton et al. (2002) used a variation of the 
residual income model to simultaneously calculate the cost of capital and the long-term growth 
rate. The authors argue that previous literature obtained lower risk premium values due to the 
excessively conservative long-term growth rate assumed.  
It appears that there is still disagreement in what concerns the actual value of the premium 
and what is the best way to estimate it. Such a parameter is a critical input for analysts to 
calculate the discount rate when performing price valuation estimates. Furthermore, these 
estimates "play an important role in capital markets" (Pinto, Robinson, and Stowe 2019), with 
analysts' price targets and recommendations representing a primary source of information for 
investors (Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver 2002; Mikhail, Walther, and Willis 2007). Thus, it is 
also essential to understand how analysts derive and adjust their estimates of market risk 
premium and cost of capital.  
2.2. Analysts' Estimates of Market Risk Premium 
Pablo Fernandez, Corporate Finance professor at IESE, conducts yearly surveys to infer the 
MRP used by analysts and other finance professionals. Between 2010 and 2019, the average 
premium reported in the U.S. was 5.5%, with an average yearly standard deviation of 1.5%, not 
exhibiting any particular declining trend, as suggested by Claus and Thomas (2001) and 
McGrattan, Jagannathan, and Scherbina (2001). Nonetheless, the surveys highlight significant 
cross-analyst dispersion in the same year, suggesting that analysts take different approaches to 
estimate the risk premium. 
Balakrishnan, Shivakumar, and Taori (2020) evaluated cost of equity (Re) estimates 
revealed in analysts' reports. The study is mainly focused on which company characteristics are 
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associated with higher Re values, and results point out to strong association with the firm's beta, 
low market value, and book-to-market ratio. Additionally, the authors find that analysts tend to 
adjust Re estimates following company financial announcements, which suggests that measures 
such as the risk premium and the cost of equity might be "strategically used to justify 
predetermined target prices or stock recommendations"3 (Balakrishnan, Shivakumar, and Taori 
2020). 
There is an extensive body of literature that aims to understand whether analysts' 
estimations of cost of capital are made on the basis of financial theory, most of which through 
analyst surveys (Richardson, Teoh and Wysocki 1999; Bradshaw 2004; Guay, Kothari and Shu 
2011; Green et al. 2014; Brown et al. 2015). Notably, Pinto, Robison, and Stowe (2019) 
conducted a scientific survey on 13,500 CFA valuation practitioners (1,980 valid responses). 
Among the obtained results, the authors report that most respondents tend to estimate the MRP 
when performing valuation exercises. However, there is still a significant number of 
professionals (24.5% of respondents) who do not calculate the risk premium. Although no 
evidence is provided, the authors propose that analysts might use a standard value predefined 
by their brokerage firm. 
Bancel and Mittoo (2014) surveyed 365 finance practitioners about valuation 
methodologies and inputs used in discount rates. Responses exhibit substantial cross-individual 
dispersion in the MRP used and lack of significant adjustment across time. The latter finding is 
fascinating given that the time-period surveyed (2006-2012) includes the 2008 financial crisis, 
which would imply an upward adjustment of the market risk premium, according to finance 
literature (Harvey 1989; Li 2001; Paoli and Zabczyk 2009; Gourio 2012). 
Similarly, Mukhlynina and Nyborg (2016), Green et al. (2014) argue that analysts exercise 
little effort when estimating the market premium and the discount rate, providing evidence that 
 
3 See Appendix 1 for real episode that illustrates this possibility 
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such estimates suffer from significant execution error. Green et al. (2014) analysed 120 analyst 
reports and found unusually variable and high market risk premia (7-8%), compared to 
theoretically motivated assumptions. Along the same lines, Mukhlynina and Nyborg (2016) 
gathered 272 responses and reported significant variability in both the estimation method and 
the risk premium used.  
2.3. Ambiguity and Analysts’ Disagreement  
A parallel theme that has gained substantial relevance in the finance community is dispersion 
and disagreement between analysts' forecasts.  
Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) documented an anomaly in capital markets that 
challenged standard asset pricing theory. The authors found that companies with higher 
dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts produce lower future returns. This was considered 
puzzling since disagreement is accepted as a good proxy for uncertainty (Zarnowitz and 
Lambros 1987), which is usually associated with higher required returns. 
Johnson (2004) attempted to justify the previous puzzle by drawing a clear distinction 
between fundamental and parameter risk. The author defines the former as the random evolution 
of the underlying parameter, independent from the informational environment, while the latter 
represents uncertainty generated by the degree of information available about a company. 
Johnson argued that dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts should be considered a proxy for 
parameter risk, which is specific to each company (idiosyncratic). In this case, the results 
obtained by Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) do not necessarily conflict with the 
established relationship between systematic risk and required return.  
Although Johnson (2004) and subsequent literature (Barinov 2013) have provided 
reasonable explanations for the puzzle observed, uncertainty and analyst disagreement remain 
active topics. Most papers tend to focus on earnings and cash flow disagreement. In contrast, 
little to no analyses are performed on analysts' disaccord about systematic risk (measured by 
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the dispersion of MRP estimates used by analysts) and how it correlates with the size of the 
premium. This is particularly interesting if we consider systematic disagreement a reasonable 
proxy for uncertainty and ambiguity.  
Ambiguity aversion has been documented by several studies, where the majority provide 
abundant evidence on the positive correlation with required returns (Abel 2002; Chen and 
Epstein 2002).  
More recently, Ngo, Rieger, and Yuan (2018) estimated the implicit cost of equity for a 
total of 28,256 companies (from 54 countries) and tested the relationship with ambiguity 
(measured by country-specific risk preferences inferred through the INFRA survey4). The 
authors found significant and robust evidence that ambiguity aversion contributes to higher 
required returns (cost of equity). Similar results were reported by Ju and Miao (2012) and Zhang 
(2019). Provided that dispersion in MRP estimates represents a proxy for ambiguity, we should 
expect inflated market premia in periods exhibiting a higher degree of systematic disagreement. 
Literature on the market risk premium and analysts' estimates is still an area with several 
unanswered questions. We fill some of the gaps of previously published work by analysing a 
large sample of price targets. Although surveys allow to individualize analysts while not 
requiring any estimation method to infer the MRP used (analysts provide the answer), most of 
the time, the samples gathered are not sufficiently large to perform robust testing. 
Simultaneously, it is unreasonable to assume that analysts who do not follow finance theory to 





4 Tests decision making of individuals when faced with alternative lottery scenarios over unknow risks (Ngo, 
Rieger, and Yuan 2018) 
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Analysts' Implied Market Risk Premium 
There are several methods available to extract the cost of equity implicit in analysts' forecasts. 
Amongst the models exhibited in previous literature, the most commonly used are the dividend 
growth and the residual income models (Gebhardt, Lee, and Swaminathan 2001; Claus and 
Thomas 2001; Easton et al. 2002). In this paper, we use a variation of the residual income 
model, similar to the approach developed by Daske, Gebhardt, and Klein (2004). Afterward, 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is employed to calculate the MRP. 
The residual income model (also known as abnormal returns) is an accounting-based stock 
valuation method, representing an alternative to models that are too dependent on long-term 
assumptions. It is a specification of the dividend growth model (1), assuming that changes in 
the book value of equity are driven by either earnings or transactions with shareholders (clean 














 𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡 = 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑡 +  (𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑡 −  𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑡−1)  
 
⇔  𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑡 = 𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡 −  (𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑡 −  𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑡−1) (2) 
where: 
𝑝0: current stock price 
𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑡: expected dividends per share at year t  
𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡: expected earnings per share at year t  
𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑡: expected book value of equity per share at the end of year t 
𝑟𝑒𝑑: cost of equity derived from the dividend growth model  
Equation (2), the clean surplus rule, is the residual income model's main assumption. It 
disregards some captions that are usually less relevant in companies’ financial statements, such 
as foreign currency translation gains and losses.  
The residual income formula can be derived from the two previous equations. 
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𝑝0: current share price 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 =  𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡 −  𝑟𝑒𝑟 (𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑡−1): expected residual income at year t 
𝑏𝑝𝑠0: book value of equity recorded at the end of the last fiscal year 
𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑡: expected book value of equity per share at the end of year t 
𝑟𝑒𝑟: cost of equity derived from the residual income model 
Equation (3) demonstrates how the price of a stock can be computed through the sum of the 
current book value of equity and the present value of residual income.  
Several authors have used the model exhibited in Equation (3). However, this formula only 
allows for the estimation of the cost of equity at a specific date in the year, which is predefined 
by the disclosure of financial statements (at the time book value is reported). We use a revised 
version of the residual income model, similar to the one developed by Daske, Gebhardt, and 
Klein (2004), to extract the implicit cost of equity at any given estimation date. This way, we 
use price targets (instead of the current stock price) of individual analysts at different dates to 
calculate the implicit cost of capital in each estimate. Equation (4) presents the modified version 
of the residual income model: 
 
𝑝𝑎 = 𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑎 +  
𝑒𝑝𝑠1𝑎 −  𝑟𝑒 (𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑎)
(1 + 𝑟𝑒)1−𝑎
+  
𝑒𝑝𝑠2 −  𝑟𝑒 (𝑏𝑝𝑠1)
(1 + 𝑟𝑒)2−𝑎
+  
𝑒𝑝𝑠3 −  𝑟𝑒 (𝑏𝑝𝑠2)
(1 + 𝑟𝑒)3−𝑎
+
𝑒𝑝𝑠4 −  𝑟𝑒 (𝑏𝑝𝑠3)
(1 + 𝑟𝑒)4−𝑎
+ ⋯ +  




 𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑎 = 𝑏𝑝𝑠0  × (1 +  
𝑒𝑝𝑠1
𝑏𝑝𝑠0
 )𝑎 (5) 
 𝑒𝑝𝑠1𝑎 = 𝑒𝑝𝑠1 − (𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝𝑠0) (6) 
where: 
𝑎 : period between the beginning of the fiscal year and the estimation date (in years)  
𝑝𝑎: price target  
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𝑏𝑝𝑠0: book value per share at the end of the fiscal year preceding the estimation date 
𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑎: expected book value per share at estimation date  
𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑡: expected book value per share at the end of fiscal year t 
𝑒𝑝𝑠1𝑎: expected eps for the period between the estimation date and the end of the 1
st fiscal year 
𝑒𝑝𝑠𝑡: expected earnings per share at year t 
𝑟𝑒: cost of equity derived from the modified residual income model 
Equation (3) (initial residual income formula) uses the book value of the previous fiscal 
year (bps0), whereas in (4), the book value is adjusted to the earnings that have been generated 
between the beginning of the fiscal year and the estimation date, through formula (5). The latter 




calculate the expected book value at the estimation date. Simultaneously, the earnings used in 
the first fraction term of Equation (4) (eps1a) are also adjusted to the previous point, using 
formula (6)5. 
All components of model (4) were retrieved from I/B/E/S. The I/B/E/S Detail History 
database provides analysts' earnings, book value, and price target estimations throughout the 
year. Our sample includes forecasts/price targets announced between 2010 and 2019 for 
companies incorporated in S&P500 with fiscal-year end between September and December.  
We only considered forecasts that contained earnings and book value estimations for (at 
least) the first two fiscal years and a price target (eps1, eps2, bps1, bps2, pa), discarding all 
observations for which one of these variables was not provided. For forecasts where earnings 
per share were not available from the third year onwards (eps3-5), we used the 5-year eps growth 
best estimate6 to calculate it7. The same procedure was applied to the estimates of the book 
value of equity. 
Given that the database does not provide analysts' forecasts of earnings after the fifth fiscal 
 
5 For more information on this model, please see Daske, Gebhardt, and Klein (2004) 
6 Median of analysts' company-specific 5-year eps growth forecasts for each I/B/E/S statistical period, g3-5 
7 eps3 = eps2 × (1 + g3-5); eps4 = eps3 × (1 + g3-5); eps5 = eps4 × (1 + g3-5); bps3 = bps2 × (1 + g’3-5); bps4 = bps3 × 
(1 + g’3-5) 
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year, it was assumed that the residual income increases at a constant rate glt (long term growth) 
after year 5, following the same approach as Claus and Thomas, 2001. 
 
𝑝𝑎 = 𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑎 +  
𝑒𝑝𝑠1𝑎 − 𝑟𝑒 (𝑏𝑝𝑠𝑎)
(1 + 𝑟𝑒)𝑡−𝑎
+  




𝑒𝑝𝑠5 −  𝑟𝑒 (𝑏𝑝𝑠4)
(1 + 𝑟𝑒)5−𝑎
+ [ 
(𝑒𝑝𝑠5 −  𝑟𝑒 𝑏𝑝𝑠4)(1 + 𝑔𝑙𝑡)
(𝑟𝑒 − 𝑔𝑙𝑡) × (1 + 𝑟𝑒)5−𝑎
] 
(7) 
The book value recorded at the end of the fiscal year preceding the estimation date (bps0) 
was retrieved from the I/B/E/S Actuals database. The long-term growth rate (glt) used was the 
historical expected long-term inflation in the United States, provided by FRED8. The latter 
assumption is not as critical in the residual income model as in other valuation methods (Claus 
and Thomas 2001). The proportion of the price target explained by the terminal value is reduced 
when the book value of equity is introduced as a determinant of the share price. 
Equation (7) is a 5-degree polynomial in 𝑟𝑒 with many possible solutions. Using a GRG 
non-linear optimization method (replicating MS excel Solver), re was calculated (similar to the 
IRR calculation process). 
After extracting the implicit cost of equity for each forecast, the market risk premium (mrp) 
was calculated using the CAPM model. 
 
𝑟𝑒 = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽5𝑦 × 𝑚𝑟𝑝
 





The risk-free rate (𝑟𝑓) used was the prevailing yield of the 10-year
9 U.S. government bond 
at the beginning of the month of the estimation date10 (Eikon Thomson Reuters). 𝛽5𝑦  was 
calculated for each company and forecast date using "Beta Suite by WRDS." In the main 
sample, the beta was calculated using 5-year historical price data with daily frequency. 
Implicitly, we assume that all analysts under all scenarios and companies use this method to 
 
8 Expected long-term inflation is amongst the most commonly proxies for glt (Mukhlynina and Nyborg 2016) 
9 Most commonly used risk-free proxy by finance practitioners (Bancel and Mittoo 2014) 
10 E.g.: a forecast announced January 2010, was attributed the yield that prevailed on the 1st of January 2010 
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calculate 𝛽. In reality, different techniques may be employed, such as 10-year historical price 
data (𝛽10𝑦), or the Bloomberg adjusted beta (𝛽𝑏𝑙𝑚). This assumption is tested further ahead by 
simulating a sample where the beta for each firm at a specific date is calculated using the three 
previously mentioned methods and randomly assigning them to the forecasts.  
The final sample includes a total of 153,555 price targets for the 10-year period under study. 
Appendix 2 portrays detailed information about the sample on a yearly basis. 
3.2. Cross-sectional Analysis of Implied Market Risk Premium  
The MRP estimated for each observation is the primary focus of study. To understand this 
parameter's cross-section variation, we regressed it on a set of analyst/firm-specific 
characteristics. The central hypothesis tested with the multivariate regression is whether 
earnings forecast error is associated with greater MRP estimates.  Should analysts lack 
motivation to exercise effort in the MRP and discount rate estimation process, then the actual 
value used might the result of some characteristics and incentives that are not related to 
theoretical concepts and literature. 




× 𝑐𝑝𝑙𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘
9
𝑘=7
× 𝑋𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝑡
18
𝑡=10
× 𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽 × 𝐸𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖   
(9) 
Equation (9) is the main regression estimated through the Ordinary Least Square method. 
The sample is in a cross-sectional setup, where each observation corresponds to an individual 
forecast made by an analyst about a company at a given estimation date. 
𝑚𝑟𝑝𝑖  is the risk premium resulting from the estimation process explained in Section 3.1. 
𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖 represents the earnings forecast error for the first fiscal year ( 
𝐹(𝑒𝑝𝑠1)
𝑒𝑝𝑠1
− 1). Data on 
earnings reported by each company was retrieved from the I/B/E/S Actuals database. 
𝑏𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖 is the absolute value of the percentage difference between an analyst's earnings 
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forecast and the consensus forecast (|
𝐹(𝑒𝑝𝑠1)
𝐴𝑣𝑔(𝑒𝑝𝑠1)
− 1|) (Hilary and Hsu 2013). The I/B/E/S 
average earnings forecast for each period and company was retrieved from the I/B/E/S 
Summary History database.  
𝑏𝑙𝑔𝑖 is a dummy variable set to 1 if the analyst providing the forecast is employed by a top 
size decile brokerage firm. Size is calculated based on the number of analysts providing 
estimates under the same brokerage firm ID (Clement 1999) (I/B/E/S database). 
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖  replicates analyst experience, and it is measured by the number of price target estimates 
announced by the analyst providing the observation in the two years preceding the estimation 
date (I/B/E/S database).     
𝑐𝑝𝑙𝑖  , portfolio complexity, is a set of two variables representing the number of companies 
and industries followed by the analyst performing the estimate (𝑐𝑚𝑝𝑓𝑤𝑙𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑓𝑤𝑙𝑖, 
respectively) (I/B/E/S database). 
Xi is a set of company-specific control variables (market capitalization, market-to-book ratio 
and industry classification). The first two variables were calculated using the share price 
observed at the beginning of the year of the estimation date (retrieved from the CRPS database). 
Furthermore, observations were assigned to different sector groups based on the SIC code of 
the company for which the forecast was performed (Hutira 2016) (See Appendix 3). 
Ti is a set of time dummy variables representing each year of the 2010-2019 period, in an 
attempt to eliminate year-specific events that could disrupt other coefficients.  
Ei is a set of dummy variables identifying the analyst and the brokerage firm that provided 
the price target. The latter variables are used since there may be unobserved characteristics 
specific to each analyst and brokerage firm that are correlated to both the dependent and the 
independent variables, which would create biased coefficients. This is an attempt to control 
fixed effects at the analyst and brokerage firm level, reducing endogeneity issues.  
Additionally, since the sample contains different observations (forecasts) that may have 
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been produced by the same analyst, standard errors were clustered at the analyst level.  
Appendix 4 presents descriptive statistics of the dependent and independent variables. 
4. Results and Discussion  
4.1. Implied Cost of Equity  
Table 1 illustrates the average implied cost of equity obtained through the adjusted residual 
income model (Equation 7) and the respective standard deviation on a yearly basis.  
  
Table 1: Average cost of equity (Re) derived from the residual income model and respective 
standard deviation on a yearly basis 
 
The average cost of equity throughout the 2010-2019 period was 8.7%, ranging from 8.4% 
to 9.4% and exhibiting a high degree of variability each year. By itself, this result is not very 
meaningful as the sample includes forecasts for different companies, which are entitled to 
distinct sizes of cost of equity. Thus, we performed a quick analysis to gain confidence in the 
Re results obtained. We observed the correlation between the cost of equity, the market 
capitalization and the market-to-book ratio. Appendix 5 documents this experiment's results, 
exhibiting negative correlation between the cost of equity and the other two variables, 
corroborating the 3-factor model proposed by F. Fama and K. French (1993). 
An important question that may also arise is whether the model employed to estimate the 
cost of equity for each observation is the most appropriate. By introducing a company’s 
reported book value as a component to evaluate its share price, theoretically, the fraction 
explained by the terminal value is lower than in other commonly used methods, such as the 
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dividend growth model (DMG). Appendix 6 presents the average proportion of the price target 
(every year) that is explained by each of the components of the residual income formula. In our 
sample, we find that, on average, the terminal value explains 48% of the price target compared 
to c. 85% obtained by Claus and Thomas (2001) when using the dividend growth model. This 
experiment illustrates the main advantage of the residual income method, the lower relevance 
given to the terminal value, which is mostly based on uncertain long-term assumptions. 
4.2. Implied Market Risk Premium 
Using the CAPM model, the MRP for each observation was retrieved. Table 2 presents a 
summary of the estimates obtained and the respective st. deviation, on a yearly basis.  
 
Table 2: Average market risk premium and respective standard deviation on a yearly basis 
 
For the period observed (2010-2019), the average MRP fluctuated between 4.4% and 6.0%, 
with no particular trend. We also find a high degree of volatility within each year. As expected, 
most of this dispersion is driven by cross-analyst variation. However, there is still some 
dispersion for observations/forecasts provided by the same analyst (st. dev. decomposition can 
be found in Appendix 7). One possible explanation for this dispersion may be that analysts 
perform estimations for different companies and dates, meaning they might adjust MRP 
parameters throughout the year.  
The approach employed in this paper uses price targets, which allows to retrieve the implicit 
MRP under a specific estimation date. This differs from the standard procedure followed by 
previous literature on this topic, which uses companies’ market prices (Claus and Thomas 2001; 
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McGrattan, Jagannathan, and Scherbina 2001; E. F. Fama and K. French 2004). Furthermore, 
these authors provide estimates for periods before 2000 and, consequently, our results are not 
necessarily comparable with the 2-3% estimates obtained.  
 
Notes: MRP is the year average implicit market risk premium obtained through the residual income and CAPM model. 
PMRP corresponds to estimates from Pablo Fernandez’s surveys, conducted each year to analysts and finance professionals  
 
Table 3: Side-by-side comparison with Pablo Hernandez' survey results  
 
Table 3 exhibits a side-by-side comparison between our estimates and those of Pablo 
Hernandez's surveys. The magnitude of the premium estimates is quite similar, with period 
(2010-2019) averages differing by c. 0.3 p.p., while displaying a comparable trend throughout 
time. Given that the surveys’ estimates are based on individual analyst responses, it represents 
a better comparison than studies that use consensus forecasts of earnings and the share price 
observed in the market to backout the market risk premium.  
Even though our results seem reasonable and in line with similar literature, one critical 
assumption was made. To calculate the premium, we assumed that all analysts use the same 
method to calculate the company beta (5-year historical data, 𝛽5𝑦). Appendix 8 documents the 
results of a sensitivity test performed on this assumption. First, each company's beta (at each 
estimation date) was calculated through three different methods (Bloomberg adjusted beta11, 5-
year and 10-year historical data), and afterward, we randomly assigned them to each 
observation. The exercise was repeated three times, and results were quite similar to those of 
 
11 Bloomberg adjusted beta = 
2
3
 × β5y   + 
1
3
  × 1 
18 
 
Table 3 (using exclusively 𝛽5𝑦), confirming the robustness of our initial estimates.  
4.3. Cross-sectional Analysis of Implied Market Risk Premium 
Once the implicit MRP was obtained for each observation, we regressed (OLS) it on a set of 
variables representing analyst characteristics. Table 4 reports the results of the regression 
analysis performed.  
 
Notes: t-stats are in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). Standard errors are 
clustered at the analyst level.  
 
Table 4: Baseline results of regression analysis performed with implicit market risk premium 
as dependent variable 
 
Column (1) presents the OLS coefficients that resulted from regressing the implicit market 




Column (2) adds analyst characteristics (experience, boldness, and portfolio complexity). We 
further control company-specific features (market cap., M/B ratio, and industry classification) 
(Column 3). Column (4) adds time dummies to the regression to control for year specific events. 
Finally, column (5) includes analyst and employer brokerage firm ID dummies in an attempt to 
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control for fixed effects. All standard errors obtained from the regressions are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and are clustered at the analyst level. 
Across all OLS regression specifications (column 1 through 5), the coefficient for ferror is 
consistently positive and statistically significant at 1% level. According to column (1), on 
average, a one standard deviation change in the forecast error is associated with a 0.07 p.p. 
increase in the implicit market risk premium. The coefficient decreases to 0.04 when controlling 
for time effects, analyst and employer brokerage firm fixed effects (column 5).  
The significant association between the forecast error and the premium size suggests that 
analysts may adjust MRP and, consequently, discount rate estimates to compensate for overly 
optimistic earnings/cash-flow forecasts. Additionally, the magnitude of the coefficient seems 
reasonable, since a change in the market risk premium (through the discount rate) causes a 
substantially larger effect on the price target than the impact caused by a change in first-year 
earnings (see Appendix 9 for comparison between effects). 
Bold, the percentage deviation from the I/B/E/S consensus earnings forecast, exhibits a 
negative and significant relationship with the implicit MRP. As reported in column (2), a one 
standard deviation change in boldness (distance from consensus forecast) is associated with a 
0.03 p.p. decrease in the estimate of market risk premium. Moreover, we find that analysts 
employed by bulge bracket brokerage firms (blg) tend to use larger MRP estimates (columns 2 
and 3).  
Portfolio complexity, measured by the number of companies (cmpflw) and industries 
(indflw) followed by the analyst providing the forecast, also exhibits a significant association 
with the dependent variable. When controlling for company characteristics and time-effects 
(column 4), an increase (by 1) in the number of industries covered by the analyst providing the 
price target estimate is associated with a 0.16 p.p. decrease in the implicit MRP.  
When controlling for analyst and brokerage firm fixed effects (column 5), the coefficients 
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regarding analyst characteristics lose significance, as expected. Nevertheless, the main 
independent variable (forecast error) remains significant at 1% level. Although causality cannot 
be inferred from the analysis performed, it seems that estimation error may be compensated by 
the use of a larger market risk premium (and discount rate), to maintain a pre-established price 
target, as suggested by Balakrishnan, Shivakumar, and Taori (2020).  
Results presented in Table 4 derive from a regression analysis where we measure ferror 
through the percentage difference between the earnings forecast and the actual value reported 
at the end of the fiscal period. To consolidate the hypothesis that analysts providing overly 
confident earnings forecasts also use heftier MRP estimates, we redefined the variable ferror.  
Table 5 reports the results obtained when ferror (now dferror) is set as a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the forecast error is positive (overestimation). 
 
Notes: t-stats are in parenthesis. Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). Standard errors are 
clustered at the analyst level.  
 
Table 5: Baseline results of regression analysis performed with implicit market risk premium 




The evidence found is quite similar to the results documented previously. The forecast error 
coefficient remains positive and significant across all specifications of the regression. 
Interestingly, the coefficient illustrates a stronger association between the forecast error and the 
size of the premium. On average, observations where analysts overestimate earnings are 
associated with 0.1 p.p. larger market risk premium estimates (column 5), which can constitute 
evidence on the use of the premium to attenuate the effect of earnings overestimations on the 
price target.  
To summarize, the regression analyses performed provide evidence that incentives and 
analyst-specific characteristics influence the MRP estimates used when performing valuation 
exercises. The forecast error coefficient exhibits a positive and significant relation with the 
implicit market risk premium, corroborating the hypothesis that sell-side analysts, who provide 
overly confident earnings forecasts (possibly to entice to establish stable relationships with 
companies), may compensate it with a bulkier discount rate to maintain reasonable price targets. 
Simultaneously, analysts-specific characteristics exhibit robust association with the implicit 
MRP (except when using ID dummies). It may be unreasonable to assume that analysts who 
exhibit the characteristics tested deliberately and arbitrarily provide larger MRP estimates. 
Alternatively, it can be the case that these characteristics influence the analyst's estimation 
method, which consequently creates estimates that are significantly different12.  
5. Additional Analysis - Ambiguity and Disagreement 
To complement our findings of the size and cross-sectional variation of the market risk 
premium, we further analyse ambiguity and analyst disagreement. 
As mentioned in Section 2, previous literature documents that investors tend to require a 
higher premium when faced with considerable uncertainty. Under such a scenario, low yield 
 
12 E.g., analysts with more experience use forward-looking methods which, historically, have resulted in lower 
MRP estimates (Claus and Thomas, 2001). 
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bonds are considered safe havens and, thus, the market risk premium tends to expand. At the 
same time, Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) found that companies with high dispersion 
in analysts' earnings forecasts tend to generate lower future returns. We analyse this relation 
hypothesizing that earnings forecast dispersion also captures firm-specific characteristics that 
are not associated with systematic and long-term uncertainty (as suggested by Johnson, 2004). 
Instead, analyst disagreement in MRP estimates would represent a better proxy for market 
ambiguity and would better explain the size of the premium.  
To analyse the hypothesis explained above, we aggregated the initial sample (153,555 
observations) into 15,998 firm-quarter observations13. MRPi is the average market risk premium 
used in price targets of a particular company during a given quarter. Dsgmrpi, systematic 
disagreement, is the standard deviation of the implicit market risk premium used in price targets 
performed by analysts for a specific company in a given quarter. Dsgepsi is measured through 
the standard deviation of earnings forecasts made for a given company in a particular quarter.  
 
Notes: Asterisks indicate significance levels of 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level 
 
Table 6: Baseline results of regression analysis performed, with average firm-quarter implicit 
market risk premium as dependent variable  
 
Table 6 documents the OLS regression results when using MRP as the dependent variable 
and both disagreement measures as independent variables. The regression performed includes 
time-dummies to control for year-specific events and company ID dummies in an attempt to 
 
13 E.g., Observation number 1 corresponds to aggregated estimates made by analysts regarding Apple in the 1st 
quarter of 2010 
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remove company fixed effects. Additionally, all standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustered at the firm level.  
Systematic disagreement, measured by the standard deviation of the market risk premium 
estimates, is strongly and significantly associated with the size of the premium (dependent 
variable). This result follows the widely documented association between uncertainty and 
required returns (ambiguity aversion). Even though proxies for ambiguity are usually derived 
from practical experiments that evaluate how individuals behave when faced with uncertainty 
(Ngo, Rieger, and Yuan 2018), we suggest that analysts’ systematic disagreement might also 
be used as a proxy for uncertainty and ambiguity.  
Focusing on the disagreement in earnings forecasts, although significant, the coefficient is 
relatively small and negative. As suggested by previous literature, conflict in earnings forecasts 
might capture company-specific characteristics (Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina 2002; Johnson 
2004; Barinov 2013). Thus, it might not represent an adequate proxy for overall market 
uncertainty. As illustrated in the table above, disagreement in earnings forecasts does not 
explain much of the variation of the MRP.  
This analysis provides statistical evidence that systematic disagreement is strongly 
associated with the risk premium. Furthermore, dispersion in MRP estimates appears to better 
explain the size of the premium, compared to disagreement in earnings forecasts. The latter can 
be considered a measure of short-term uncertainty, which is influenced by companies’ 
characteristics and informational environment. On the other hand, systematic disagreement 
captures long-term disagreement/uncertainty, which is more meaningful for asset pricing. We 
thus suggest that dispersion in analysts’ MRP estimates represents a better proxy for ambiguity.  
Notwithstanding, caution is necessary when arguing that systematic disagreement is a good 
proxy for ambiguity. Knight (1921) highlights the distinction between ambiguity and risk. The 
author refers to the former as a situation where investors are uncertain about the probability of 
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outcomes. In contrast, the latter refers to a situation where the probability distribution of the 
result is known. In Appendix 10, we document the correlation between systematic disagreement 
and the VIX, a widely used proxy of aggregate market risk, to test this distinction.  
6. Conclusion and Final Remarks 
The market risk premium is one of the core concepts of finance theory. It is an essential 
component of the CAPM model, and thus, is of extreme importance for portfolio asset 
allocation decisions. Additionally, it is a critical input in the calculation of the discount rate 
used by analysts when performing price target estimations. 
Most literature evaluating cost of capital estimates reports that analysts might be exposed 
to incentives that result in little effort exercised in the discount rate estimation process. 
However, most evidence is based on surveys with low number of respondents, which does not 
allow for robust testing.  
This paper explores a sample of 153,555 analysts’ implicit market risk premium estimates, 
derived from publicly available price targets (I/B/E/S). We use the residual income and the 
CAPM model to backout the implicit market risk premium, obtaining an average of 5.15% 
between 2010 and 2019, matching other authors’ findings (Fernandez, P. 2010-2019). 
 We further find strong evidence that analysts who provide earnings overestimations tend 
to use a significantly larger market risk premium (+0.1 p.p.). Our approach overcomes some of 
the drawbacks associated with previously published work (survey responses), which does not 
analyse a sufficiently large number of analysts’ estimates and, most of the time, suffer from 
selection bias. Although not inferring causality, we contribute with robust evidence on the 
hypothesis that analysts may attenuate the impact of overly confident earnings forecasts on the 
price target by using heftier discount rates.   
Informal discussions tend to point out that analysts might produce aggressive earnings 
forecasts to establish and maintain stable and long-lasting relationships with the companies for 
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which the estimates are performed. These relationships can contribute to future partnerships, 
providing increased deal flow for the brokerage firm where the analyst is employed. 
Simultaneously, the MRP and the discount rate are fairly technical concepts that are not very 
transparent, which would allow analysts to manipulate them and offset the impact of aggressive 
forecasts on the price target. The evidence found in this paper supports the previous hypothesis, 
which, proven right, raises concerns on whether analysts’ estimates constitute reliable sources 
of information for investors. 
Finally, we take advantage of having calculated a large sample of analysts’ market risk 
premium estimates and address market ambiguity and disagreement. We provide solid evidence 
that dispersion in analysts’ MRP estimates is strongly associated with the size of the premium 
(coefficient of 0.8). Furthermore, we document that previously used uncertainty measures 
(disaccord in earnings forecasts) explain little to no variation of the MRP. As such, we propose 
that systematic disagreement represents a better proxy for ambiguity. 
Future work may employ other methods to estimate the market risk premium and observe 
whether similar results are obtained. Although accepted by most literature, the residual income 
is not amongst the most commonly used valuation models, and consequently, some error might 
be present in the overall size of the estimates obtained. Nevertheless, it is essential to remark 
that the conclusions drawn in this paper are based on the variation between MRP estimates and 
not on their actual value. Moreover, subsequent work can build on the evidence found on cross-
sectional variation and analyse specific analysts across time, observing cost of capital and market 
risk premium adjustments. 
Finally, future research may explore and consolidate systematic disagreement, measured by 
the dispersion in MRP estimates, as an adequate proxy for market ambiguity, through the 
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"On March 27th, 2017, nearly a month after helping Snap Inc. raise $3.4 billion in an IPO, 
Morgan Stanley published its first equity research report on the firm and gave it a target price 
of $28.00. A day later, the bank issued a revised report correcting tax calculation errors, which 
reduced the projected cash flows by a total of nearly $5 billion. In spite of this correction, the 
bank did not change its target price, preferring instead to reduce its CoE from 9.9% to 8.1%. 
While the change in CoE could have been innocuous, there were clear incentives for Morgan 
Stanley to change its discount rate, as otherwise the bank would not have been able to justify a 
buy recommendation or issue a target price comparable to peers" (Balakrishnan, Shivakumar, 
and Taori 2020). 
Appendix 2 
Even though the I/B/E/S Actuals database contains more than 100,000 yearly price target 
forecasts, given that observations were only considered if the analyst provided a price target 
and earnings and book value forecasts for (at least) fiscal years 1 and 2, the sample was severely 
reduced to a total of 153,555 observations. Table 7 portrays detailed information about the 
sample on a yearly basis. 
 






Companies were allocated to 8 different industry groups based on SIC codes. This variable was 
used as a company control variable, replicating the approach followed by Hutira (2016). 
 
Table 8: Industry classification used as a company-control variable 
Appendix 4 
 
Notes: The values illustrated correspond to statistics of the entire sample, instead of yearly averages and st. dev., as presented 
in previous tables. 
 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics of dependent, independent, and control variables 
 
The market risk premium is measured in percentage points; The forecast error is measured in 
percentage points; Boldness is measured in percentage points; Top decile brokerage firm is a 
dummy variable; Experience was retrieved in integer units and, afterward the natural logarithm 
was applied; Companies and Industries followed are measured in integer units; Market 
capitalization was retrieved in dollars, and after that, the natural logarithm was applied; Market-
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to-Book ratio has no particular measurement scale. 
Appendix 5 
Table 10 illustrates the correlation between the cost of equity (Re), the market capitalization, 
and the market-to-book ratio (M/B) using all 153,555 observations. 
 
Table 10: Pearson correlation matrix for variables cost of equity (Re), market capitalization 
(Mkt Cap), and market-to-book ratio (M/B)  
 
According to the Fama-French 3-factor model, the expected return of a stock (cost of equity) 
is negatively correlated to both the size of the firm (small-cap firms tend to overperform) and 
the M/B ratio (value stocks tend to overperform) (F. Fama and K. French 1993).  We find 
negative correlation between the cost of equity and the firm's market value (-0.03). The same 
happens for the market-to-book ratio, with a correlation coefficient of -0.05. Our results seem 
to follow the 3-factor model proposed by Fama-French (F. Fama and K. French 1993). 
Appendix 6 
Table 11 documents the average proportion of the price target (every year) explained by each 
of the residual income formula components (Equation 4). 
 
Table 11: Average proportion of price target explained by each of the components of the 




As illustrated above, on average, the terminal value represents c. 48% of the price target. 
Although still a significant fraction, it is substantially lower than the typical results obtained 
through the dividend growth model. Claus and Thomas (2001) used both models and found that 
the terminal value explains c. 85% of the price when using the dividend growth model, 
compared to c. 42% when using the residual income model.   
The experiment illustrates the main advantage of using the residual income method. By 
introducing the reported book value of equity, we attribute less relevance to the terminal value, 
which is mostly based on uncertain long-term assumptions. 
Appendix 7 
Table 12 presents the decomposition of the standard deviation found in each year’s MRP 
estimates.  
 
Notes: The two components (St. Devca, St. Devwa) estimated do not have to sum up to the total standard deviation (St. Devmrp) 
as this does not represent a mathematical decomposition. 
 
Table 12: Market risk premium standard deviation decomposition on a yearly basis 
 
St. Devmrp is the standard deviation of the market risk premium estimates measured each 
year. St. Devca (cross-analyst dispersion) is the standard deviation found between analysts’ 
average market risk premium estimates. St. Devwa (within-analyst dispersion) is the yearly 
average standard deviation found between observations from the same analyst.  
The high variability found in our sample is mostly driven by cross-analyst dispersion 
(differences in estimates provided by different analysts). However, we also observe some 
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dispersion in observations entitled to the same analyst. One possible explanation for this 
dispersion may be that analysts perform estimations for different companies and dates, meaning 
they might adjust MRP parameters throughout the year.  
Appendix 8 
Tables 13 and 14 present the results from simulating samples using three different beta 
estimation methods (Bloomberg adjusted, 5-year and 10-year historic price data). The betas 
were calculated for all companies at each estimation date and randomly assigned to the 
observations. After that, we used the CAPM model to estimate the MRP.  
 
Table 13: Side-by-side comparison between main sample results (MRP) and randomized 
samples using three different estimation methods for the beta to include in CAPM 
 
 
Table 14: Side-by-side comparison between main sample standard deviation (St. Dev.) and 
randomized samples using three different estimation methods for the beta to include in CAPM 
 
As illustrated above (Table 13), the results obtained from repeating this exercise three times 
(MRPR1, MRPR2, MRPR3) were quite similar to our main sample (using exclusively beta 
34 
 
estimated through 5-year historical data). Furthermore, the overall variability of the MRP 
estimates is also comparable (Table 14), which confirms the robustness of our sample.  
Appendix 9 
Table 15 reports the average effect on the price target caused by changes in the market risk 
premium (through the discount rate) and the forecast error (through first-year earnings forecast). 
As expected, the price target is much more sensitive to changes in the market risk premium than 
to changes in the forecast error. 
 
Table 15: Average effect on the price target caused by changes in the market risk premium 
(through the cost of equity) and the forecast error (through first-year eps forecast) 
 
A 1.p.p change in the market risk premium has an absolute effect c. 200x larger than a 1 
p.p. change in the forecast error. In other words, to compensate the impact on the price target 
caused by a 1 p.p. increase in the forecast error, it would be required to increase the market risk 
premium by c. 0.005% (1% * 
0.06%
12.39%
). Hence, the forecast error coefficient obtained in the 
regression analysis seems reasonable. 
Appendix 10 
Graphic 1 (next page) documents the relationship between the monthly CBOE Volatility 
Index (VIX) and the monthly standard deviation of our sample’s market risk premium 
estimates.  
We find small positive correlation (0.1), suggesting that systematic disagreement does not 
fully capture aggregate volatility (risk). Should this result be confirmed for larger samples, it 
may be the case that systematic disagreement, measured by the dispersion in analysts MRP 
estimates, represents a good proxy for ambiguity. Future work should test this hypothesis by 
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comparing this measure with other ambiguity proxies. 
 
Graphic 1: Relationship between VIX (CBOE volatility index) and systematic disagreement, 
measure by the st. dev. in market risk premium estimates, on a monthly basis  
 
Appendix 11 
Table 16 outlines the correlation between the yearly average MRP obtained and the real GDP 
growth. Our sample exhibits positive correlation between MRP and real GDP growth (0.1). 
 
Table 16: Estimated implicit market risk premium and real GDP growth on a yearly basis 
 
This result conflicts with the hypothesis that investors require a substantially higher return 
on risky assets during recessions, translating into an increased market risk premium. The latter 
theory has been tested several times, resulting in exhausting evidence on the counter-cyclicality 

















correlation found in our sample does not follow previous literature, the market risk premium 
estimate in this paper represents the value implied by individual analysts' forecasts. As Bancel 
and Mittoo (2014) documented, analysts and other finance professionals might abstain from 
making significant adjustments to their discount rate inputs even if, according to finance theory, 
this would be the right approach14. Furthermore, it is important to remark that the low number 
of periods under observation (10 years) does not allow for a robust analysis.  
 
 
14 Bancel and Mittoo (2014) reported that 54% of the analysts surveyed did not make any significant adjustments 
to discount rates used during the 2008 financial crisis  
